In a recent comment [1] it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed in [2] and its generalization to d-level systems in [3] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the comment. We invalidate the arguments of the comment and show that the protocols are still secure.
In a recent comment [1] , it has been argued that the protocols of quantum key distribution proposed in [2] and its generalization to d-level systems [3] , are insecure against a special type of attack. Since the comment has been addressed only to the d-level scheme proposed in [3] , we use in this reply the language of d− level systems, although we think that the authors could have primarily addressed their comment to the original two-level scheme proposed in [2] (and cited in [3] ), in which case the whole discussion including their own, would have been much simpler.
The basic idea of [3] is that Alice(a) and Bob(b) can share a maximally entangled state like a generalized Bell state
as a carrier between themselves. At the origin, Alice(a) can entangle the qudit q of the key (k) to this carrier by a local operation ( a generalization of Controlled NOT to d-dimension, namely a Controlled mod-d addition), |j, q a,k −→ |j, j + q a,k , producing the state
During the transmission the value of the q will be protected from Eve, (since the density matrix of this key qudit will be maximally mixed) and only Bob, at the destination, can extract the value of q by disentangling it from the carrier by the reverse local operation |j, j + q b,k −→ |j, q b,k .
In the original articles [2, 3] , the possibility of entanglement of Eve with the states already possessed by Alice and Bob has been taken into account and methods for preventing her from acquiring useful information have been devised. However the authors of the comment [1] show that Eve can perform suitable operations to intercept only the odd-numbered bits without being recognized by Alice and Bob. We note in passing that a similar comment has been made by these authors [4] on another protocol [5] which has been replied in [6] .
To the original objection of the author of this reply, pointed to in [6] , that intercepting a fixed known subset does not imply insecurity, the authors of the comment only add a vague and inexact argument at the end of their comment and claim that Eve can stop and re-start her attack at any time she wants and therefore she can intercept any random subset of the key bits unknown to the legitimate parties.
We show in this reply that the above claim in un-justified. The reason is quite simple. Stopping and re-starting the attack by Eve, requires disentangling and reentangling herself with the carrier without destroying the carrier in possession of Alice and Bob. In fact, as shown in the original papers and reproduced in equations (3-7) of the comment, this entangling process is a fairly delicate process, since Eve should entangle herself with the carrier of Alice and Bob, only by performing local operations on her own qudit(e) and the key qudit(k) which is in transmission. This important point has been simply overlooked by the authors of the comment and as we will show here explicitly when Eve entangles herself with the carrier in the first round, she can disentangle and re-entangle herself with the carrier only in the odd rounds of transmission.
The authors of the comment do not present any explicit calculation as to how Eve can disentangle herself from the carrier and suffice to say that she can do this by " parity switching operations" whose meaning is unclear. To help the authors we explicitly show how she can do this only in the odd rounds and strongly insist that the authors show the way for the even rounds.
Consider again equations (3-7) of the comment [1] , which show the state of Alice(a), Bob(b), the key qudit in transmission(k) and Eve(e) at various stages of the first round. Equation (4) is the initial state when Eve wants to start her attack, (i.e. entangle herself with the carrier). She does this by a controlled operation on the qudits k and e, in the form
(equation 4 and 5). After Bob extracts the key, Alice and Bob are left with the carrier (7) which is now entangled with Eve. Eve can disentangle herself at stage 5, by the reverse operation |j + q 1 , j + q 1 k,e −→ |j + q 1 , 0 k,e .
She can do this in any other odd round. However the authors of the comment, for the purpose of their attack, change this carrier by the operation shown in equation (8) of [1] . The carrier at the beginning of round 2 is given in equation (9) of [1] . For the second round, the corresponding states are those of equations (9-14) of [1] . The authors of the comment do not show how at any stage of this round or any other even round, Eve can disentangle herself from the carrier. Unless they show this explicitly, their argument about the possibility of stopping and restarting the attack and hence intercepting arbitrary subsequences of the key qudits is incomplete and their conclusion about the insecurity of our protocol is invalid.
In conclusion we have shown that Eve can stop and re-start her attack only at odd rounds of transmission and in this way can only intercept the odd-numbered key qudits, which by no means implies the insecurity of such a protocol [6] .
